Distribution of Powers for the Conventionality Control of Domestic Law Between Constitutional and Ordinary Courts: Decentralisation and Recentralisation
İç Hukukun Sözleşmeye Uygunluk Denetiminden Geçmesi İçin Anayasa Mahkemeleri ve İlk Derece Mahkemeler Arasındaki Güç Dağılımı: Adem-i Merkeziyet mi? Yeniden Merkezileşme mi?
Yota NEGISHI
This paper analyses the distribution of powers between constitutional and ordinary courts with regard to the judicial control of compliance of domestic law with human rights conventions (the conventionality control). On the one hand, all national courts including ordinary courts are required to perform the decentralised conventionality control as constituent organs of States Parties to human rights conventions. Internal and external demands have induced ordinary judges to engage in judicial norm-control even if their competencies are limited within the centralised system of constitutional review. Particularly, the conventionality control is decentralised by ordinary jurisdiction through disapplication and consistent interpretation of domestic norms in light of international criteria. On the other hand, constitutional courts need to engage in the centralised conventionality control in cases where ordinary judges would prejudice democratic values and legal certainty in accomplishing the judicial mission. First, compared with bureaucratically selected ordinary judges, constitutional judges who are democratically elected through political process would provide more appropriate forums to safeguard public autonomy against individual autonomy radically expanded through the jurisprudence of human rights courts. Second, given the danger that different ordinary judges reach different conclusions, constitutional courts with exclusive interpretive authority would also be more effectual channel to ensure both the predictability as formal legal certainty of international standards and their acceptability as substantive legal certainty through judicial dialogue with human rights courts. In essence, this study advocates a fluid allocation of national judicial authorities in accordance with both constitutional principles and international obligations.
Conventionality Control and Constitutionality Control, Constitutional and Ordinary Jurisdiction, Consistent Interpretation, Democracy, Legal Certainty.
Bu makalede iç hukukla insan hakları sözleşmelerinin uyumunun yargısal denetimine ilişkin olarak anayasa mahkemeleri ile genel mahkemeler arasındaki güçlerin dağılımı incelenmiştir. (the conventionality control-sözleşmeye uygunluk denetimi) Bir taraftan, genel mahkemeler de dahil olmak üzere tüm ulusal mahkemelerin, insan hakları sözleşmelerine taraf devletlerin kurucu organları olarak merkezilikten uzak sözleşmeye uygunluk denetimini gerçekleştirmiş olmaları gereklidir. Dahili ve harici talepler, anayasal incelemenin merkezi sistemi içinde sınırlı yeterlilikte olmalarına rağmen ilk derece hakimleri yargısal norm denetimi yapmaya itmiştir. Özellikle, sözleşmeye uygunluk denetimi olağan yargı tarafından yanlış uygulamalar ve uluslararası kriterler ışığında ulusal normların tutarlı yorumlanması yoluyla merkezilikten uzaklaşmıştır. Öte yandan, ulusal yargıçların yargısal faaliyetlerini yerine getirirken demokratik değerlere ve hukuki belirliliğe halel getirdikleri durumlarda anayasa mahkemeleri merkezi bir sözleşmeye uygunluk denetimine ihtiyaç duyarlar. İlk olarak, bürokratik yollarla seçilen ilk derece hakimlerle karşılaştırıldıklarında siyasi bir süreç sonunda demokratik yollarla seçilen anayasa mahkemesi hakimleri, bireysel özerkliğe karşı kamusal özerkliği teminat altına alırken, insan hakları mahkemelerinin içtihatlarıyla radikal bir biçimde geliştirilmiş daha uygun yargılama ortamları sağlayabilirler. İkinci olarak ise, farklı ilk derece yargıçların farklı sonuçlara ulaşmaları tehlikesi göz önüne alındığında anayasa mahkemeleri münhasır yorumlayıcı otoriteriyle, uluslararası standartların resmi hukuki belirlilik olarak öngörülebilirliğinin ve insan hakları mahkemeleriyle adli diyalog yoluyla maddi hukuki belirlilik olarak kabul edilebilirliğinin sağlanmasında daha etkili bir kanal olabilirler. Esas itibariyle bu çalışma anayasal hükümler ve uluslararası yükümlülükler doğrultusunda ulusal yargı otoritelerinin değişken dağılımını savunmaktadır.
Uygunluk Denetimi ve Anayasal Denetim, Anayasal ve Olağan Yargılama, Tutarlı Yorum, Demokrasi, Yasal Belirlilik.
INTRODUCTION
International law has traditionally imposed international obligations on the state as an indivisible entity possessing its own separate personality.1 However, in light of the institutional deficiencies for global governance, there may be a functional necessity to authorise domestic courts to promote international goals in line with Scelle's dédoublement fonctionnel theory.2 From this perspective, international law may designate domestic judges as natural judges of international law to ensure the opportunity for the state to comply with its international obligations.3 Specifically, domestic courts assume an important role to review the legality of national acts against the yardstick of international obligations and to ensure rule-conformity.4 This is called the conventionality control of domestic law analogous to the traditional mission of the constitutionality control of legislation.5
The doctrine of control de convencionalidad has been dynamically developed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) which has dealt with structural human rights violations caused by domestic norms incompatible with international standards. In Almonacid Arellano v Chile (2006), the San José Court for the first time required the Judiciary to exercise the conventionality control of the self-amnesty law under the Pinochet regime.6 In the later judgment of Cabrera Garcia and Montiel Flores v Mexico (2010) concerning the abuse of military jurisdiction, the Court further elaborated the doctrine, particularly as regards the distribution of powers between domestic courts:
[W]hen a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, all its bodies, including its judges, are also bound by such Convention, which forces them to see that all the effects of the provisions embodied in the Convention are not adversely affected by the enforcement of laws which are contrary to its purpose and end. The Judiciary [Los jueces y órganos vinculados a la administración de justicia], in all its levels, must exercise ex officio a sort of 'conventionality control' between the domestic legal provisions and the American Convention, evidently within the framework of their respective competence and the corresponding procedural rules. To perform this task, the Judiciary has to take into account not only the treaty, but also the interpretation thereof made by the Inter-American Court, which is the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention.
