The National Threshold Of 10% Of The Turkish Electoral System

Sinem YARGIÇ

The electoral systems should be based on the aim of balancing the principles of stability and fair representation. The national threshold of 10% of the Turkish election system has been the object of criticisms for many years. As the highest national threshold in Europe, it has been questioned on its compatibility with the principle of a democratic state. Because of its importance for striking the balance between the principles of fair representation and governmental stability, in this article, firstly, the jurisprudence of the Turkish Constitutional Court and the ECtHR on this threshold and then, the international organizations approach to it will be analysed.

National Threshold of 10%, Election System, Fair Representation, Governmental Stability.

INTRODUCTION

The Electoral Law no. 2839 on the election of members of the National Assembly lays down the rules of the Turkish electoral system. According to the section 33 of this Law, in a general election parties may not win seats unless they obtain, nationally, more than 10% of the votes validly cast. In other words the political parties failing to receive at least 10% of the valid votes throughout the country in general elections cannot be represented in the parliament.

The national threshold of 10% of the Turkish election system has been the object of criticisms for many years. As the highest national threshold in Europe, it has been questioned on its compatibility with the principle of a democratic state. Although it is provided by the electoral law, rather than the Constitution, it has also been debated in the context of the discussions concerning the new constitution. Because of its importance for striking the balance between the principles of fair representation and governmental stability, in this article, firstly, the jurisprudence on this threshold and then, the international organizations’ approach to it, will be analysed.

I. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF COURTS

The Turkish Constitutional Court's approach to the compatibility of electoral thresholds with the principle of a democratic State has been contradictory. The Constitutional Court's case-law on electoral systems shows that in some of its judgments, it adopted an approach based on judicial activism while in the others, it prefered an approach based on judicial self-restraint.